

## DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES SAFETY BOARD

TO: Steven Stokes, Technical Director  
FROM: William Linzau and Rory Rauch, Site Representatives  
SUBJECT: Oak Ridge Activity Report for Week Ending August 7, 2015

**Continued Safe Operability Oversight Team (CSOOT):** This week, the CNS CSOOT issued its annual report documenting an evaluation of Building 9212's conditions, operations, and safety data during the last year. This was the latest assessment in response to a Board letter dated March 13, 2007, that highlighted the safety risks associated with continuing to operate Building 9212. The CSOOT's evaluation did not identify any safety issues that would warrant limiting operations in Building 9212. Accomplishments during the reporting period include a reduction in the administrative limit for material-at-risk in Building 9212 (see 6/5/15 report) and completion of the Nuclear Facility Risk Reduction Project (see 1/23/15 report).

The growing maintenance backlog of equipment in Building 9212 is a continuing CSOOT concern. The report notes improvements to maintenance planning and execution processes but the maintenance backlog for enriched uranium operations has grown by 15 percent. The CSOOT is concerned that operating with known material issues could degrade safety and recommends an increase in designated facility maintenance, engineering, and production support personnel to slow the growth of the backlog. In response to this recommendation, the CNS Y-12 Site Manager is establishing a dedicated maintenance team to cover certain areas of Building 9212. Wet chemistry and metal production areas are to serve as the pilot for this team, which is scheduled to be established no later than October 1, 2015.

Last year's CSOOT report, which also included an assessment of Buildings 9204-2E and 9215 (see 7/4/15 report), noted that changes to the scope of the Uranium Processing Facility would likely require the enriched uranium missions of Buildings 9204-2E and 9215 to continue into the 2030s and beyond. The CSOOT recommended the development of an Extended Life Program for these facilities. NNSA accepted the recommendation, and the CSOOT has taken the lead to develop the program by the end of calendar year 2015 (see 1/2/15 report).

**Building 9212:** Last month, a Criticality Safety Officer (CSO) questioned the use of metal inserts during the transport of uranium in modified hospital cans on dollies. The inserts prevent the cans from tilting and assist in providing the required nuclear criticality safety (NCS) spacing between cans. The CSO measured the spacing between cans and found that the insert could potentially allow movement that violates NCS spacing requirements. The CSO directed that the area be placed under administrative control, and NCS personnel directed removal of the inserts on the affected dollies and placing the dollies out of service. NCS personnel will perform an analysis of the inserts and the spacing requirement prior to allowing these dollies to be placed back into service.

**Transuranic (TRU) Waste Processing Center:** The site reps conducted a walkdown of the location associated with a recent contamination event (see 7/31/15 report). Discussion with the OREM Operations Division Director, OREM Facility Representative (fac rep) and the WAI Radiological Controls Manager revealed that the contamination event occurred when a heavy object being removed from a glovebox caused the adhesive tape on the sealed end of the plastic sleeve to disconnect and the sleeve to open. The operator's normal method for sealing the cut end of the sleeve is to apply tape around the circumference of the compressed sleeve and then place a circular adhesive disc over the cut end. They do not double the cut end back over the sleeve and re-apply tape (commonly known as a J-seal). The site rep questioned the lack of a J-seal and the OREM fac rep provided this feedback to WAI. WAI committed to re-evaluate the sealing method. Operations remain paused pending completion of this evaluation.